Some Rights and Liabilities Arising Out of the Sale of Food for Human Consumption by Moss, Herbert K.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 1 
1932 
Some Rights and Liabilities Arising Out of the Sale of Food for 
Human Consumption 
Herbert K. Moss 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Herbert K. Moss, Some Rights and Liabilities Arising Out of the Sale of Food for Human Consumption, 18 
ST. LOUIS L. REV. 045 (1932). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss1/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
Moot Court system there will also be briefs and oral arguments
such as would be presented to an appellate tribunal.
To fill the vacancy caused by the desire of Mr. Sam Elson to
enter active practice, Mr. Edward S. Stimson has been appointed
Assistant Professor of Law. He has A.B., B.S. and A.M. de-
grees from Ohio State University and the degrees of J.D. and
S.J.D. from the University of Michigan. He has served as Pro-
fessor of Economics at Carroll College and as assistant in law at
the University of Michigan. He has also had three years' ex-
perience in the actual practice of law in Toledo, Ohio. He is the
author of a book, JURISDICTION TO TAX, which will shortly be pub-
lished by the West Publishing Co.
Notes
SOME RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF THE
SALE OF FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION
It is a matter of rather common knowledge not only that ordi-
nary articles for human consumption, being normally of a some-
what perishable nature, prove often unwholesome, but also that
the consumption thereof may be attended by disastrous results
to the health of the individual. Not at all infrequently a lawyer
is called upon to prosecute an action for the recovery of damages
for injuries sustained by the eating of such food. If the article
has been prepared by a manufacturer and sold to a retailer from
whom the victim purchased it, the lawyer must decide upon
whom liability may be fastened and upon what theory the right
of recovery must be based. Manifestly, in the normal course of
affairs it would be more beneficial to the aggrieved party to ob-
tain judgment against a large corporation manufacturing food-
stuffs than against a small independent retailer with a slight
pecuniary investment. Perhaps the victim has been served the
deleterious food in a restaurant. If so, the lawyer is confronted
by the additional question whether the ordinary rules concerning
sales of goods can be applied thereto.
Let us consider first the liability of the individual retailer.
The decision in the English case of Begge v. Parkinson1 in 1862
is usually pointed to as inaugurating the general rule that the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose shall be ap-
plied in the sale of food as against the immediate vendor, and it
would be a useless multiplication of authorities to cite decisions
I (Exch. 1862) 7 H. & N. 955, 158 Eng. Repr. 758.
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sustaining this doctrine. Historically, it is important to note
that Begge v. Parkinson arose out of a pre-existing contract to
supply provisions, but the cases since decided have expressly ex-
tended the rule to present orders of goods.2 The general rule
may be stated that there is an implied warranty of fitness in a
sale of food for human consumption as between a retailer and a
consumer when the latter makes known, either expressly or im-
pliedly, to the former the intended purpose for which the article
is to be used and relies on the skill and judgment of the former
that it is fit for such a use.3 A perusal of current decisions indi-
cates that the universality of this rule has never been seriously
questioned, either in those jurisdictions acting under the Uniform
Sales Act or under the common law.
However, there are some issues arising out of the application
of the rule to particular fact situations which are highly contro-
versial and must be discussed here. The rule in the case of
Rinaldi v. Mohican Co.4 to the effect that a "mere purchase by a
customer from a retail dealer in foods of an article ordinarily
used for human consumption does by implication make known to
the vendor the purpose for which the article is required" G is uni-
versally accepted. Thus, it is easy to satisfy the first requisite
for the application of this warranty, i.e. the necessary knowledge
in the seller of the buyer's intended use.
There is considerable contrariety of opinion as to how to sat-
isfy the second prerequisite for the application of the implied
warranty of fitness, namely, did the buyer, either expressly or
impliedly, rely on the seller's skill and judgment in making the
selection. The advent into the business of supplying and pre-
paring foods of the more highly specialized methods of canning
and packing foodstuffs by a manufacturer or packer who sells
his products to the retailer has raised the question of whether it
can be said that the buyer relies on the retailer's skill and judg-
ment in the selection of a particular article, since obviously the
retailer cannot have made an inspection of the contents of the
particular can or sealed package. The argument that there is
no such reliance has prevailed in some courts. A leading case
recognizing this view is Aronowitz v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,0 but
its value as a precedent is greatly weakened by the fact that it
was decided in one of the lower appellate tribunals in New York
and also because it has been rendered ineffective by other New
2 Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co. (1908) 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481
and the cases cited therein.
S2 Williston on Contracts (1931) 1874.
4 (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 472.
5 (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 73, 121 N. E. 472, 473.
0 (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 272, 236 N. Y. S. 133.
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York decisions to be mentioned hereafter.7 The action was
brought by the party alleged to have been injured as a result of
eating canned goods sold the plaintiff by the defendant retailer,
but packed by a third party. The Court, citing Rinaldi v. Mo-
hican Co.,8 points out that the purchaser of food who may assume
that the seller has had an opportunity to examine the food sold,
conclusively relies on the seller's skill and judgment,9 but that it
cannot be assumed that a retailer of canned goods has had an op-
portunity of examining the contents of a can.
To be sure the seller has an opportunity to examine the
exterior and to purchase of a reputable manufacturer, but
the court knows of no process whereby the seller can ex-
amine the contents of a particular can without opening it.
A purchaser is undoubtedly fully aware of the fact, so that in
such instance the mere purchase standing by itself, does not
conclusively establish reliance by the purchaser upon the
supposed skill or judgment of the seller as to the contents of
the sealed and unopened can.10
In Burkhardt v. Armour & Co." the court in meeting the con-
tention that the retailer of canned goods is in no better position
than the purchaser himself with respect to judging the whole-
someness of the contents of the original package points out, that
the rule being well established that in the sale of ordinary goods
the seller is liable for latent defects, this liability should fasten
itself upon the seller with even greater tenacity in the case of the
sale of foods. The court in the same opinion shows that the ex-
istence of a rather complex manufacturing and distributing sys-
tem in the food industry would greatly lessen the possibility of
the victim of the deleterious food recovering against the original
manufacturer, whereas the retailer is in a far better position to
ascertain the responsibility and reliability of the original packer.
The court in Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.' 2 points out, in
upholding the liability of a retailer in the sale of canned goods,
that the buyer himself could by no exercise of "individual sa-
gacity" make an intelligent selection of canned goods, while the
retailer should at least have exercised skill and judgment in the
selection from among reputable dealers. This view gives legal
effect to the real reliance placed in the dealer which is that he
shall exercise skill and judgment in the selection of the manu-
facturer, rather than of the contents of the particular can.
7lnfra p. 48.
8 (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 472.
9 (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 74, 121 N. E. 472.
10 (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 272, 273, 236 N. Y. S. 133, 134.
11 (Conn. 1932) 161 AtI. 385.
12 (1918) 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225.
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In New York, however, the ruling in Aronowitz v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co.13 and similar cases has been nullified by the interpre-
tation placed by the courts on ahother implied warranty, i.e. the
warranty arising when goods are purchased of a seller dealing in
goods of that type that the goods are of merchantable quality. In
Ryan v. Progressive Stores Inc.24 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that in the sale of food for human consumption when
the buyer does not rely upon the judgment or skill of the seller, as
where the buyer calls for an article by its patent or trade name,
there nevertheless exists an implied warranty of merchantability
and that, if the goods sold were not fit for human consumption,
they could not be of merchantable quality. The result achieved is
possibly a meritorious one in that, if an exception were made for
goods sold in the original package, the buyer would in a majority
of cases be relegated to his remedy against the packer, which
would necessarily entail greater difficulties in the prosecution of
the suit. The reasoning of the court in reaching its decision is
subject to criticism since the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility, as the very name shows, grew up under the common law as
applicable solely to sales between an original vendor and a pur-
chaser for resale.15 Not only is its historical origin distinct from
the implied warranty of fitness, but it has been codified as a sep-
arate warranty under the Uniform Sales Act.' 6 Thus, the Court
might more logically have extended the implied warranty of fit-
ness, rather than distorting so completely the implied warranty
of merchantability. The majority of the courts refuse to allow
this broad and far reaching rule of liability.
As a necessary corollary to the rule in some jurisdictions that
a retailer is not liable on an implied warranty when he resells
goods in their original package, there is the proposition that in
such cases the liability of the retailer, if any, must be based on
negligence.' 7 This negligence would consist in the failure to
exercise reasonable care in the selection of reputable wholesalers
from whom to purchase his supply of canned goods. Because of
difficulties of proof this remedy is of course inferior to one upon
a warranty.
Another quite interesting field of litigation involves the rights
and liabilities arising out of the purchase of articles for human
13 (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 272, 236 N. Y. S. 133.
14 (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105.
.5 2 Williston on Contracts (1931) 1878.
18 Uniform Sales Act sec. 15.
17fDothan Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks (1918) 16 Ala. App. 639, 80
So. 734; Fleetwood v. Swift & Co. (1921) 27 Ga. App. 502, 108 S. E. 909;
Scruggins v. Jones (1925) 207 Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743; Trafton v. Davis




consumption by a customer from a purveyor of food, like a
restaurant keeper. Here again we are confronted with a decided
division of authority with reference to the grounds, if any at all,
of the liability of the person serving the food. The case leading
the array of authorities which base the liability of the purveyor
upon a breach of warranty is Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co.' s
A suit was brought by a person alleged to have received injury
from deleterious food served to him in a restaurant operated by
the defendant. Obviously, to establish liability on the theory of
warranty the victim must show that the transaction between the
purveyor of the food and the customer amounted to a sale of the
food, so as to bring the transaction within the purview of the
implied warranty of fitness in the sale of food. The court in the
instant case relied on certain cases holding that the service of
food and beverages was a sale under criminal statutes forbidding
the sale of certain types of food and drink.19 Drawing such an
analogy seems extremely dangerous in view of the fact that such
judicial decisions may have been made purposely to forestall
evasions of statutes which enunciate a profound public policy.
To fortify its conclusion that such a transaction gave rise to lia-
bility on a warranty, the court reviewed certain very early
English decisions and commentaries which pointed to absolute
liability on the part of a "victualer."0o A statement in one case,
typical of the other statements relied on by the court, was, "If a
man goes into a tavern for refreshment and corrupt meat or
drink is there served him, which occasions his sickness, an action
lies against the tavern keeper . . . an action lies against him
without express warranty, for it is a warranty in law."2 ' The
court concludes by pointing out that it had been firmly established
in that state that an implied warranty of fitness existed between
a retail dealer and a consumer and that the same arguments
would apply with equal cogency to purveyors of food.
It would be an incongruity in the law amounting at least
to an inconsistency to hold with reference to many keepers
of restaurants who both supply food to guests and also put
up lunches to be carried elsewhere and not eaten on the
premises, that, in case of want of wholesomeness, there is a
liability towards the purchaser of the lunch to be carried
away, founded upon a implied condition of the contract, but
that liability to a guest who eats a lunch on a table at the
premises rests wholly upon negligence. 22
18 (1918) 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407.
19 (1918) 231 Mass. 65, 68, 120 N. E. 407, 408.
20 (1918) 231 Mass. 65, 71, 120 N. E. 407, 409.
21 Keil. 91, 72 Eng. Repr. 254.
22 (1918) 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407.
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Within the group of cases which hold that it is a sale and that
the restaurant keeper is liable on a warranty, there is a subdi-
vision founded on the case of Barrington v. Hotel Astor,23 which
would limit liability to food prepared by the purveyor himself.
Other courts reject this limitation 24 on the general rule as un-
founded, as it is unless the doctrine of Aronowitz v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co.25 be accepted as the measure of the scope of the implied
warranty of fitness.
Some of the courts feel that sound considerations of public
policy are of sufficient cogency to impose liability on the restau-
rant keeper.26 The following excerpt is typical:
The trend of the times is to require eating houses to be as
sanitary as possible, and to protect the public as far as can
be by inspection, tests, etc. The importance of pure food to
the public and the inability of a guest to see and examine his
food prior to its preparation and cooking, of necessity re-
quires that one who holds himself out as a public purveyor of
food and an expert in producing and preparing the same be
held as an insurer against injury occasioned by failure to
furnish wholesome and pure food to eat.27
Under such a test it is not absolutely clear whether the liability
is one based on a warranty or an example of a tort liability im-
posed without reference to the fault of the defendant.
In direct opposition to this line of decisions we have those au-
thorities permitting recovery only on a showing of negligence. 28
The dissenting opinion in Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co.29 is
frequently cited as disposing of the effect of the language in the
early English cases. Justice Crosby there says that what ap-
pears to be a liability on a warranty is based either on the fact
that the victualer had actual knowledge of the unwholesomeness
of the food or else upon some ancient statute which imposed a
penalty for serving such food or drink. The existence of "pure
food" statutes has been held immaterial on the ground that they
23 (1918) 184 App. Div. 317, 171 N. Y. S. 840.24 Clark Restaurant Co. v. Simmons (1927) 29 Ohio App. 220, 163 N. E.
210.
25 (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 272, 236 N. Y. S. 133.
26 Smith v. Carlos (1923) 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S. W. 464.
27 (1923) 215 Mo. App. 488, 490, 247 S. W. 468.
28Greenwood Cafe Co. v. Lovinggood (1916) 197 Ala. 34, 72 So. 354; Mer-
ril v. Hudson (1914) 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533; Rowe v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. R. Co. (1922) 29 Ga. App. 851, 113 S. E. 823; Kenny v. Wong Lea
(1925) 81 N. H. 427, 128 Atl. 343; Nesky v. Childs Co. (1927) 103 N. J. L.
464, 135 Atl. 805; Coreu v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1932) 10 N. J. Misc. 489, 159
Atl. 799; Clark Restaurant Co. v. Rau (1931) 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N. E. 196.
29 (1918) 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407.
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were designed to benefit both hotels and individuals and not to
impose an additional liability on hotels for the sole benefit of indi-
viduals. 30 The courts have expressly denied that there is any
public policy in favor of imposing absolute liability.3 1 They point
to the alleged fact that the whole tendency of the recent develop-
ment of the law of tort liability is away from any such liability
without fault. In at least one state this tendency has reached
the dignity of a positive rule of law.32 Furthermore, by the great
weight of authority, there can be no possibility for applying the
doctrine of implied warranties in the sale of food, as in legal con-
templation the restaurant keeper sells service rather than food.33
The courts point out that if any such liability had existed it would
have been the foundation for innumerable suits, more especially
since the absolute liability of a hotel keeper for the goods of his
guest would prove a potent analogy.3 4
Relying solely on legal authority one is bound to reach the con-
clusion that no implied warranty can exist where the food is sold
for immediate consumption on the premises. But if one chooses
to disregard strict adherence to legal doctrines then the anomaly
becomes more apparent in that one would not ordinarily differ-
entiate between the sale of articles of food to be taken from the
premises of the seller and the "sale" of articles to be consumed
where bought, nor does it seem proper that different liabilities
should attach in the two cases.
When an attempt is made to hold the original vendor, even
more difficult problems are presented. It would not be unnatural
to find a division of the authorities upon this subject, but the
diversity of the theories upon which the various courts proceed in
arriving at their respective results is both interesting and
startling.
Because of the absence of direct contractual relationship be-
tween the ultimate consumer and the original vendor, most of
the cases which attempt to hold the original vendor liable have
sounded in tort rather than in contract. At the outset, the liti-
gant is confronted by the rule, generally accepted in tort law, that
a vendor or manufacturer of "an article is not liable to third par-
ties who have no contractual relationship with him for negli-
gence in the construction, manufacture, or sale of such article," 35
30 Traves v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. (1913) 183 Ala. 415, 62 So.
851.
31 Rowe v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. (1922) 29 Ga. App. 851, 113
S. E. 823; Valeri v. Pullman Car Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 218 F. 519.
32 Kenny v. Wong Lea (1925) 81 N. H. 427, 128 Atl. 343.
-3 Nesky v. Childs Co. (1927) 103 N. J. L. 464, 135 Atl. 805; Kenny v. Wong
Lea (1925) 81 N. H. 427, 128 Atl. 343.
34 Valeri v. Pullman Car Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 218 F. 519, 521.
35 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 463.
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on the theory that an extension of liability would be against
sound public policy. Two important exceptions to this rule have
gradually developed. They are: (1) "that a person who deals
with an imminently dangerous article owes a public duty to all
into whose hands it may come to exercise care in proportion to
the peril involved"; and (2) "that a person who knowingly sells
or furnishes an article which, by reason of defective construction,
or otherwise, is inherently dangerous to life or property, with-
out notice or warning of the defect or danger, is liable to third
persons who suffer therefrom".3 6
It is easy to state the exceptions in the terms frequently used
by the courts, but there is still a considerable contrariety of opin-
ion whether the first of these exceptions applies to food. A case
whose history well indicates this diversity of view is Chysky v.
Drake Brothers Co.37 The party seeking recovery from the
original manufacturer drew her complaint on the basis of a lia-
bility in warranty. The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court 38 sustained a judgment for the plaintiff on this theory by
reference to the opinion of Justice Cardozo in the celebrated case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co.,39 which is usually con-
ceded to have extended the doctrine of Thomas v. Winchester 40
(which involved the sale of an article inherently dangerous) to
the sale of articles not inherently dangerous but having in them-
selves the potentiality of destruction and mutilation of human
life if improperly and negligently prepared by the original manu-
facturer.41 The Court felt that the sale of food properly fell
within the extended rule of the MacPherson case. The Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court, pointing out that the plaintiff relied on an al-
leged breach of warranty when there was not the requisite
privity of contract with the original vendor. The analogy of
covenants running with the land as recognized by the law of real
property was rejected. As to the purported authority of the
MacPherson case, the Court pointed out that that opinion went
no further than to say that "under certain facts and conditions
the manufacturer of an article would be liable to a third person,
even though no contractual relation existed between them, if the
article sold was negligently prepared or manufactured." The
question of the liability being in tort or on a warranty apparently
resolves itself into an interpretation of the case of Thomas v.
36 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 465, 466.
37 (1923) 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576.
,S (1920) 192 App. Div. 186, 182 N. Y. S. 459.
39 (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
40 (1852) 6 N. Y. 397.
413 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 466.
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Winchester and similar cases. A survey of the better reasoned
and more carefully considered cases involving the application of
the rule of Thomas v. Winchester and the extension made by the
MacPherson case show that they agree in holding that liability
can only exist where the original vendor has failed to use the
requisite degree of care.4 2
Some courts have made use of the second exception to the gen-
eral rule to impose an absolute liability on the original manu-
facturer on the ground that food is an article "inherently danger-
ous." In the case of Manzetti v. Armour & Co. 4 the court al-
lowed the party injured to recover from the original manu-
facturer not only for his personal suffering, but also for ihe al-
leged destruction of his business as a caterer of food. The court
ruled that the sale of food was an act of such a character as to
bring into operation the exception to the general rule denying
liability of the original vendor to third parties, that there may
be such liability where "the thing causing the injury is of a
noxious or dangerous kind." The court held that the liability
was absolute, whether or not there was negligence.
Another court has used the "pure food" statute to fix liability
on the original vendor on the theory that the violation of a statute
designed for the public safety will render the disobedient vendor
liable to the victim of his disobedience for damages flowing proxi-
mately from the neglectful act.44 Undoubtedly this decision is in
consonance with the rule of law that where a statute for the pro-
tection or benefit of individuals prohibits a person from doing
an act, or imposes a duty upon him if he disobeys the prohibition
or neglects to perform the duty, he is liable to those for whose
protection the statute was enacted. 45
Other courts feel the necessity of imposing an absolute liability
on the original vendor. Some of these courts refuse to indulge in
technical niceties to substantiate their conclusions. In Hertzler
v. Manshum46 the court said that the "law recognizing the im-
perative need of consumers of foodstuffs to rely upon the care of
the manufacturer, and the inability of the consumer in a case
like this to detect injurious impurities or poisonous substances
therein, and the complex system of modern production and dis-
tribution holds the manufacturer who prepares foodstuffs des-
tined to be sold to and consumed by the public, liable to consumers
purchasing from a retail dealer for a breach of the implied war-
ranty arising from poisonous substances therein."
42 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 466 and cases cited.
- (1913) 75 Wash. 662, 135 Pac. 633.
44 Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co. (1909) 107 Minn. 104, 119
N. W. 155.
45 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 361.
46 (1924) 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155.
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Other judges have preferred to rely solely on legal processes to
establish a contractual liability. In Ward Baking Co. v. Triz-
zino47 the court said in effect that the contract of warranty be-
tween the original vendor and his immediate vendee is really one
made for the benefit of the ultimate consumer, who may then sue
the original vendor under the American rule of contract law per-
mitting the third-party beneficiary to sue the original obligor.
The courts in Pennsylvania limit the application of the breach
of warranty theory to those instances where the article sold and
prepared by the original vendor is placed in a package which is
not to be opened by the intermediate vendor.48 This apparently
takes cognizance of a physical fact to sustain a privity of con-
tract which is essentially a legal relationship. However, it has
the merit of giving some remedy in warranty to the consumer in
those states which follow the doctrine of Aronowitz v. F. W.
Woolworth C0.49 and hold that there is no implied warranty of
fitness made by the intermediate vendor in such a situation.
The better rule would seem to be in favor of an absolute lia-
bility on the original vendor in view of: (1) the practical diffi-
culty in proving that a certain process in the manufacture of a
foodstuff has been conducted negligently, when the processes of
manufacture are so complicated that an individual not in the em-
ploy of the defendant could have very little knowledge concern-
ing their details; (2) the nature of the use to which food is to be
put, demanding the greatest protection available, which can be
gained most certainly by the imposition of an absolute liability;
(3) the fact that the universal adoption of the "pure food" stat-
utes shows a legislative recognition of a public policy to secure to
the people the utmost protection of the public health; and (4)
the fact that the jury would still exist as a safeguard to prevent
the success of fraudulent suits against a manufacturer by persons
not actually injured by his products.
HERBERT K. Moss, '33.
RECENT EXTENSIONS OF THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR
DOCTRINE
It is a well established principle in the Anglo-American legal
system that specific negligence must be proved in cases of unin-
tended personal injury in order to attach tort liability to the de-
fendant. It is equally well recognized that the doctrine of res
47 (1923) 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557.
48 Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg (1931) 102 Pa. Super.
Ct. Rep. 515, 156 Atl. 537.
49 (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 272, 236 N. Y. S. 133.
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